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Compensation of Out-of-State
Attorney
Plaintiff, a licensed California attorney,
came to New York at the request of the
defendant to give advice concerning the
possible institution of an antitrust suit in
the federal district court. He participated
with licensed New York attorneys in ex-
tensive pretrial preparations, but was dis-
charged prior to the commencement of the
antitrust suit. The plaintiff subsequently
brought this action to receive payment for
services rendered. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on re-
hearing en bane, held that although the
plaintiff was not admitted to the New York
bar and had not sought the permission of
the federal court to appear in the action,
the implied contract for services rendered
was enforceable. The Court predicated
its holding upon two grounds: (1) the
plaintiff probably would have been granted
permission to practice if he had requested
it, and (2) the privileges and immunities
clause prohibits a state from restricting a
citizen from retaining an out-of-state at-
torney to collaborate with a local attorney
regarding a federal claim or defense.
Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364
F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S.
- , 87 Sup. Ct. 597 (1966).
The need for regulating the legal pro-
fession in order to prevent unqualified per-
sons from practicing law was recognized
at an early date.' Section 270 of the
New York Penal Law 2 makes it unlawful
for a natural person to practice or appear
as an attorney for one other than himself,
1 See 1 POLLACK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 216 (2d ed. 1899).
2 This section has been re-enacted without
change as N.Y. JuDiciARy LAW § 78.
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or furnish legal services, or hold himself
out to the public as entitled to practice,
or advertise as an attorney, without having
been admitted or licensed. As do similar
statutes of other jurisdictions, this section
seeks to protect the public by confining
the practice of law to licensed members
of the bar of the particular jurisdiction
who are subject to the supervision and
control of that state's highest judicial
authority. 4 In People v. Alfani,5 the New
York Court of Appeals held that section
270 prohibits one who is not licensed in
New York from holding himself out as
an attorney and executing legal documents
and instruments. The Court there con-
cluded that much of the work of an at-
torney occurs outside the courtroom, and
that the legislature did not intend to omit
such conduct from the restrictions of this
section.6 In In the case of Roel,7 the Court
3 For a discussion of a similar statute of another
state see Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468,
476, 48 N.W.2d 788, 794 (1951).
4 People v. Black, 156 Misc. 516, 282 N.Y.
Supp. 197 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
5 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919).
6 Accord, Fein v. Ellenbogen, 84 N.Y.S.2d 787
(lst Dep't 1948) (the appellants violated § 270
by coming to New York and preparing property
agreements without being licensed in New
York); People v. Collins, 271 App. Div. 887,
67 N.Y.S.2d 53 (Ist Dep't 1946) (the de-
fendant violated § 270 by representing falsely
that he was a licensed attorney). See also
People v. Hanham, 266 N.Y. 573 (1935) (mem-
orandum decision) (a layman represented him-
self as an attorney, took the necessary steps
prior to instituting a negligence suit, and was
held to have violated § 270); In re Clark, 256
App. Div. 674, 11 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1st Dep't
1939) (a layman violated § 270 by preparing
a pamphlet explaining how to make a will
without legal aid); In re Wenger, 186 Misc.
966, 61 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (mem-
orandum decision) (the defendant violated § 270
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of Appeals extended section 270 to include
the conduct of a licensed Mexican attorney
who maintained an office in New York
for the purpose of advising clients and
drafting legal documents relating to Mex-
ican divorce law. The fact that the at-
torney gave no advice concerning New
York law did not preclude the Court from
finding a violation of this section.
As comprehensive licensing requirements
became common, the courts, to deter the
unlicensed practice of law, permitted a
party contracting with an unlicensed at-
torney to defend on the ground of illegality
of contract in any action by the attorney
for compensation for services renderedA
Thus, any person not duly qualified under
the laws of the particular jurisdiction was
deprived of the means to enforce his
right to compensation. Since complete
deprivation of compensation was often a
severe sanction, the courts developed an
exception to this rule under the "isolated
transaction" doctrine. This doctrine al-
lowed an unlicensed attorney to obtain
compensation for such practice of law
which could be classified as a single, iso-
lated act of professional service.' Although
the New York courts initially utilized
the "isolated transaction" theory to ex-
cuse what would have been a violation of
section 270, they gradually yielded to the
strong public policy to construe this statute
strictly. 10
by taking care of the dispossession proceedings
for a landlord).
7 3 N.Y.2d 234, 144 N.E.2d 24, 165 N.Y.S.2d
31 (1957).
8E.g., Tuppela v. Matheson, 291 Fed. 728 (9th
Cir. 1923).
9 Note, 43 VA. L. REV. 411, 416-17 (1957).
'
0 People v. Goldsmith, 249 N.Y. 586 (1928)
(memorandum decision); People v. Weil, 237
In what appeared to be a reversal of
this trend, the appellate division, in Spivak
v. Sachs," held that a California attorney,
unlicensed in New York, could recover on
a contract for services rendered in New
York. The attorney's conduct involved
what the court considered to be a solitary
incident and, therefore, did not constitute
the unlawful practice of law under section
270. The litigation involved a matrimonial
action in which the attorney's services in-
cluded the rendering of opinions regarding
financial settlements, custody of children,
and a jurisdictional issue. When Spivak
reached the Court of Appeals, the decision
of the appellate division was reversed.1 2
The Court held that section 270 makes
the giving of legal advice unlawful, and,
therefore, the acts of the California at-
torney were sufficient to violate this sec-
tion. However, the Court implied that the
"isolated transaction" doctrine still has life
where a layman drafts a single legal in-
strument, but neither pretends to be an at-
torney nor exacts a large fee. 13 Thus, it
is apparent that section 270 has a very
broad scope, including many incidental
and out-of-court activities in its definition
of the practice of law.
In addition to state regulation, attorneys
are governed by the federal courts before
which they appear. Each of the district
and circuit courts has full authority to
determine both the qualifications of its at-
App. Div. 118, 260 N.Y. Supp. 658 (1st Dep't
1932).
1121 App. Div. 2d 348, 250 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1st
Dep't 1964).
12Spivak v. Sachs, 16 N.Y.2d 163, 211 N.E.2d
329, 263 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965).
131d. at 167, 211 N.E.2d at 331, 263 N.Y.S.2d
at 956.
torneys and the procedure to be followed
in screening and admitting them. The
common characteristic of these rules of
the federal courts is that they are flexible
and practical. In many of the circuit
courts it is required that an attorney al-
ready admitted to the court make the
proper motion seeking the admittance of
another attorney. 14  Others allow the ap-
plicant for admission to make the motion
and require only an appropriate certificate
from a member of the bar.15 In addition,
the rules for the southern and eastern
district courts of New York provide that:
a member in good standing of the bar
of any state . . . may upon motion be
permitted to argue or try a particular
cause in whole or in part as counsel
or advocate. 16
While the rules of the various federal
courts are basically similar, certain vari-
ances make it evident that the particular
procedures demanded by some are more
burdensome than others. Thus, the ease
14 F.C.A. Rules c, Fourth Circuit, Rule 6, p.
120; F.C.A. Rules c, Sixth Circuit, Rule 7,
pp. 139-40; F.C.A. Rules c, Eighth Circuit, Rule
6, p. 159; F.C.A. Rules c, Tenth Circuit, Rule
7, pp. 183-84.
3-5F.C.A. Rules c, Third Circuit, Rule 8, p.
105.
16 Rules of the United States District Court
for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New
York, Rule 3(c), p. 16. In these districts, when
an applicant for admission is a member of the
New York State bar or is admitted to practice
before any of the district courts of New Jersey,
Connecticut, or Vermont, no court motion, but
a simple petition and affidavit is the only re-
quirement with which these applicants must com-
ply. Id., Rule 3(a), pp. 15-16. Other rules
of the Southern and Eastern Districts of New
York relate to the provisions of designating an
office and a party within the district for the
acceptance of service during the litigation. Id.,
Rule 4(a), (b), p. 17.
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with which a client may retain an attorney
from another state may depend, in part,
upon the complexity of the local rules and
the ability of the party to comply with
them. However, just as a state may not
utilize its power of regulation of attorneys
to infringe the rights of individuals, 7
it is clear that neither may district court
rules abridge the rights of a class of liti-
gants to use the federal courts."8
The concurrent interest of the state and
federal judicial systems in regulating the
attorneys who practice before them gave
rise to the question of whether an attorney,
who wishes to appear in a federal court
and has complied with its rules, must also
comply with the appropriate laws and rules
of the state in which the federal court
sits. An analogous question was pre-
sented to the United States Supreme Court
in Sperry v. Florida,19 wherein the Court
held that where a party was not a lawyer,
but was qualified to appear before the
United States Patent Office to represent
a patent applicant pursuant to federal law,
the state could not prohibit activity pur-
suant to the application as unlawful under
state laws governing the practice of law.
It was conceded that the party was not
a licensed Florida attorney and was prac-
ticing law in Florida within the terms of
a statute similar to New York's section
270. However, the Court held that where
an "attorney" 20 has complied with the
17 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia,
377 U.S. 1 (1965).
18 Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280
(5th Cir. 1964).
19 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
20 Id. at 384. The term "attorney" here en-
compasses an agent, attorney at law or other
person eligible to practice before the Patent
Office.
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rules of a particular federal agency, he
can not be hindered by the laws of the
state in which the administrative tribunal
sits.21
In the instant case, plaintiff, a Cal-
ifornia attorney, sued to recover for legal
services rendered in New York in the
prosecution of a federal antitrust claim.
Defendant argued that since plaintiff was
not a licensed New York attorney and
did not comply with the rules of admission
of the federal court, their contract was
unlawful and unenforceable. 22  However,
the trial court held that plaintiff could re-
cover for his services because his conduct
constituted "solitary incident," and, there-
fore, was not a violation of Section 270
of the New York Penal Law as inter-
preted by the appellate division in Spivak
v. Sachs. 23 The fact that plaintiff had not
complied with the rules of admission of
the federal court was found not to be
conclusive against the plaintiff. The court
pointed out that it was the responsibility
of the defendant's New York attorneys
to make the motion for plaintiff's admis-
sion.24  Although this motion had never
been made, the court in the exercise of its
discretion chose not to require it. When
the case was appealed to the three-judge
panel of the court of appeals, the Spivak
decision relied upon by the district court
had been reversed by the New York Court
of Appeals. Therefore, the circuit court
21Accord, People v. Miller, 23 App. Div. 2d
144, 259 N.Y.S.2d 647 (lst Dep't 1965).
22Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 235 F.
Supp. 1, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), afl'd, 364 F.2d
161 (2d Cir. 1966).
2321 App. Div. 2d 348, 250 N.Y.S.2d 666
(1st Dep't 1964).
24 Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., supra note
22, at 12.
reversed the district court, and found
plaintiff's conduct to be unlawful under
Section 270 of the Penal Law. Conse-
quently, it prohibited his recovery of com-
pensation for services rendered. Upon re-
hearing, the court of appeals, en banc,
affirmed the district court's decision with-
out relying upon the Spivak case. Analyz-
ing the nature of the contract under which
plaintiff was employed, the Court reasoned
that since the defendants contemplated the
necessity of court appearances by plaintiff,
they impliedly promised to make all the
motions needed to make such court ap-
pearances lawful. If the motions had been
made, there was no reason to believe that
plaintiff would not have been admitted.
Hence, the Court continued, plaintiff's
conduct would have been immune from the
prohibitions of Section 270 of the Penal
Law rendering the contract fully enforce-
able. Since Spanos' conduct would have
been incident to the activities authorized
by his compliance with the district court
rules, the contract was a legal bargain
susceptible of being lawfully performed
without his being admitted to the New
York bar. Thus, the Court found that an
attorney practicing before a federal court
need not comply with the rules of the
particular state in which the federal court
sits. The Court considered defendant's
failure to make the motion for plaintiff
to be a breach of its promissory duty,
and found in favor of plaintiff under the
rule that if a party unjustly prevents the
performance of a condition of his own
promissory duty, he eliminates that per-
formance as a condition.
While the Court noted that the above
analysis would normally be sufficient to
dispose of the case, the importance of the
problem warranted the further holding that
under the privileges and immunities clause
of the Constitution, no state can prohibit a
citizen with a federal claim or defense
from engaging an out-of-state attorney to
collaborate with a local attorney and give
advice concerning that claim or defense
within the state. The Court recognized
the reluctance of the judiciary to expand
the applicability of the privileges and im-
munities clause by enlarging the concept
of national citizenship, but pointed out
that a citizen must be able to exercise a
right conferred by federal law by the
use of necessary and appropriate means.
Thus, the right to defend oneself in an
antitrust case necessarily includes the right
to seek the aid of a nonresident specialist
in this field. The Court emphasized that
this right is especially necessary in light
of the specialization required in complex
fields such as antitrust. Coincident with
the right to hire an out-of-state expert is
the duty to pay him for his services, and,
therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to com-
pensation for services renderedY5
The Court pointed out that a liberaliza-
tion of the district court rules would not
be a sufficient solution to the problem
since some situations would not require
the out-of-state attorney to appear in the
federal court to perform his services. Thus,
he would not seek admission to the federal
court and his conduct would be held in
violation of a statute similar to Section
270 of the New York Penal Law. Thus,
the Court felt a need to apply the priv-
ileges and immunity clause to insure the
rights of both the local citizen and the
foreign attorney in such a situation.
25 Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d
161 (2d Cir. 1966).
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The dissenting opinion emphasized that
plaintiff had practiced law contrary to the
prohibitions of Section 270 of the Penal
Law since he was not admitted to the New
York bar and had not complied with the
rules of the district court. 26  The dissent
saw no reason to ignore the public policy
of New York by allowing plaintiff to re-
cover. In disputing the application of the
privileges and immunities clause to the
facts of this case, the dissenting judge
pointed out that New York did not pro-
hibit defendant from retaining plaintiff.
Furthermore, granting that the defendant
has a federal right to retain an out-of-
state counsel, the dissenting opinion
reasoned that the privileges and immunities
clause does not give the retained counsel
a right to recover for his services. In
conclusion, the dissent suggested that the
majority's holding would destroy the
power of any court to exercise control
over those who practice before it.27
The Court in the instant case took an
unusual step when it construed the priv-
ileges and immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment of the Constitution to
include the right to retain an out-of-state
attorney. The privileges and immunities
clause forbids a state from enacting legis-
lation abridging the privileges of United
States citizenship. In the Slaughter House
Cases,2 the Supreme Court of the United
States distinguished state and federal cit-
izenship and the rights and privileges de-
rived from each. 29 In Crandall v. Nevada,'30
2Id. at 171.
27 Id. at 172.
2883 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
29 Implicit in this distinction is the fact that a
state may abridge privileges of state citizenship
providing no other portions of the federal or
state constitutions or laws are thereby violated.
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the Court discussed those privileges which
derive from federal citizenship. 31  Unless
a particular privilege is a unique result
of federal citizenship, it is not protected
from state infringement under the privileges
and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Attempts to extend the pur-
view of this clause to include a right not
directly resulting from federal citizenship
have been suppressed by the courts.3 1
Thus, the privileges and immunities clause
has been applied only restrictively, and
only to those rather unique rights derived
The Supreme Court has consistently held that
Congress did not seek to bring the whole
spectrum of civil rights under control of the
federal government and thereby censor all rights
derived from state citizenship (Crandall v.
Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867)). The
privileges derived from state citizenship are
those fundamental rights which belong to
citizens of all free governments. These rights
include the protection of the government, the
rights of property, and the pursuit of happiness
under protection of law.
3073 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
31 The Court included the following as privileges
derived from federal citizenship: the fight to
come to the seat of government to transact bus-
iness, share its offices and seek its protection; the
free access to seaports and protection on the
high seas or in a foreign nation; the right to
petition for a redress of grievances; and the
rights derived from federal treaties. In Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), the Court
expanded the rights of national citizenship to
include the right to vote for national officers,
to protection under the custody of United States
marshalls, and to enter public lands.
2 In Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935),
it was held that the right of a citizen of one
state to enter into a contract with a citizen of
another state is a privilege of United States
citizenship. However, Madden v. Kentucky, 309
U.S. 226 (1964), overruled this holding and
stated that the right to carry on one's trade or
business was not a privilege of federal citizen-
ship.
from federal citizenship.38
The majority was careful to limit its ap-
plication of the privileges and immunities
clause to the particular facts presented,
i.e., where a foreign attorney was retained
by a client to come to his state to work
with an attorney licensed in that particular
state, in the preparation of a case having
a federal claim or defense. However, the
Court did not discuss the applicability of
its holding to a case where federal juris-
diction is based only on diversity of cit-
izenship, or where the foreign attorney did
not collaborate with a local attorney. In
applying the privileges and immunities
clause to a new area, the Court established
stringent conditions based upon the facts
of this case. By so doing, the Court has
sought to avoid becoming the subject of
widespread criticism for extending a con-
stitutional clause which has been narrowly
interpreted in the past. Rather than al-
lowing each federal court to apply its own
procedural rules in similar cases, the Court,
in basing its holding on the privileges
and immunities clause, has attempted to
formulate a rule applicable to all federal
courts. This result is perhaps necessary
due to the broad application and the com-
plex nature of modern federal law, which
can not be universally applied in all states
without allowing every litigant equal ac-
cess to the best legal advice available.
It seems clear that the Spanos case
did not alter the concept that each court
has the power to regulate the admission of
'.1 In contrast, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment has been expanded to in-
clude many of the rights guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947).
its attorneys. The public policy to protect
citizens from fraudulent and incompetent
legal advice remains an essential consid-
eration. It is outweighed, however, by the
necessity of affording all citizens an equal
opportunity to obtain expert advice con-
cerning complex federal laws and regula-
tions. Although the holding of the present
case makes a significant inroad into the
province of state regulation of all attorneys
within its geographic bounds, it does not
undermine the state's power to regulate the
activities of attorneys in any critical fash-
ion. Since the great majority of legal
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problems arising within a state will of
necessity concern state, rather than federal,
law, all attorneys advising in these matters
will continue to be closely regulated by
their state. Those crossing state lines to
advise on merely federal matters will tend
to be attorneys whose opinion and repu-
tation are valued and whose advice is com-
petent. Furthermore, the actual practice
of law before federal courts remains com-
pletely subject to the judicial regulations of
the particular courts, and properly so, in
order to prevent any significant deteriora-
tion in the quality of the federal bar.
Homosexual Resident Alien
Deportable as a Psychopathic
Personality
Petitioner, a resident alien, was ordered
deported on the ground that, being a
homosexual at the time of his entry into
the United States, he was excludable under
Section 212(a) (4) of the Immigration
and Naturalization Act of 1952 1 as a
"psychopathic personality." On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed, holding that the term "psy-
chopathic personality" was a legal word
of art which was clearly intended to in-
clude homosexuals, and, therefore, was not
unconstitutionally vague. Boutilier v. Im-
migration and Naturalization Serv., 363
F.2d 488 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, -
U.S. -, 87 Sup. Ct. 285 (1966).
The power to deport is a weapon of
defense and reprisal and is inherent in
' Immigration & Naturalization Act of 1952,
§212(a) (4), 66 Stat. 182, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)
(4) (1964).
every sovereign state. 2 Congress, by virtue
of its constitutional authority to regulate
foreign commerce, has the power of de-
portation.3 In order to supplement this
power, Congress may also deny a person
admission to the United States, or impose
such reasonable restrictions on his ad-
mission as it deems proper.4
This power to exclude and deport has
been utilized from the outset of our
government, and, to date, the basic pat-
tern of the procedure has remained es-
sentially the same.5  The deportation of
undesirable aliens, however, became dor-
mant after 1798, and the practice was not
re-established until 1888.6 Criteria for
2 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
587-88 (1952).
- Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04
(1889).
4United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
6Developments in the Law-Immigration and
Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REV. 643, 644-45
(1953).
6 Id. at 646.
